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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - DENIAL OF HEARING FOR "SECURITY
RISK" WHO WAS FORBIDDEN ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT PROPERTY WHERE ErI-
PLOYED DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. - In order to enter and leave the
premises of the Naval Gun Factory where she worked as a cook for a private
corporation Rachel Brawner was required to have an identification badge. On
November 15, 1956, she was notified by her supervisor that he had been told by
the Security Officer to pick up her badge "for security reasons." Mrs. Brawner
was not told what the security standards were nor why she had failed to meet them,
nor was she afforded a hearing to meet the evidence supporting the conclusion
that she was a security risk. In accord with the contract between the Union and
her employer, the matter of Rachel's dismissal was submitted to a board of arbitra-
tion. Following the board's decision that Rachel Brawner was discharged for good
cause and that the real grievance of both employee and union was against those
who had denied Rachel access to the place of her employment, the union filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against
Neil McElroy, then Secretary of Defense.
The court, without opinion, entered an order dismissing the complaint. Argu-
ment on appeal was heard by a division of the Court of Appeals composed of
Judges Edgerton, Fahy, and Danaher. Upon the authority of Greene v. McElroy,1
the division reversed, Judge Danaher dissenting. However, a petition for rehearing
en bane was granted. A new majority reversed the decision of the division, and
in affirming the judgment of the district court, held: government officers have
"unfettered" power to control ingress and egress to federal property, and that they
were within their authority in applying this power to Rachel Brawner.2 Cafeteria
& Restaurant Wkrs. Local 473 v. McElroy, 284 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert.
granted, 364 U.S. 843 (1960).
The year 1947 can be pointed to as the modem starting date for "security
risk" cases raising problems of confrontation.' In that year President Truman
created his Federal Employees' Loyalty Program.4 The order left the extent to
which accused employees could confront their accusers up to the Loyalty Review
Board which it had created. This Board, after much disagreement, decided on a
policy of non-confrontation. 5 The instant case raises again the crucial issues which
were born of this loyalty program.
Rachel Brawner was deprived of her job without notice, without a hearing,
and without the disclosure of a single piece of the evidence against her. The ulti-
mate constitutional question involved is whether Congress or the President can
authorize such summary procedure in cases where the accused is labeled a "security
risk." The Supreme Court has not decided this question.6 In Bailey v. Richardson,7
the first security case to reach the Supreme Court, the appellant had been dis-
charged from government employment on disloyalty grounds. The circuit court
had held8 that "the due process clause does not apply to the holding of a govem-
1 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
2 Chief Judge Prettyman, and Justices Burger, Miller, Danaher, and Bastian constituted
the majority. Justices Fahy, Edgerton, Bazelon and Washington dissented.
3 Rauh, Nanconfrontation in Security Cases: The Greene Decision, 45 VA. L. REv. 1175
(1959).
4 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947). However, President Eisenhower
voided this order when he issued Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). After
Greene v. McElroy, President Eisenhower revised 10450 by issuing Exec. Order No. 10865,
25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960).
5 Rauh, supra note 3, at 1175.
6 See Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Cf. Kent v. Dulles 357
U.S. 116 (1958), and Dayton v. Dulles 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
7 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
8 Judge Edgerton, in a strongly worded dissent, argued for confrontation.
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ment office."9 The judgment was affirmed on appeal.' 0 In Peters v. Hobby," a
Senior Professor of Medicine at Yale was accused of being a communist and re-
leased from his government position. The Court reversed in his favor but on tech-
nical grounds. This occurred, however, over the objections of his attorney, who
wanted the constitutional issue decided.' 2  In Greene v. McElroy,3 the Court
explicitly avoided the constitutional issue, "whether those procedures under the
circumstances comport with the Constitution we do not decide.' 14 The case involved
the vice president of a government defense contractor, whose security clearance
for government documents was lifted by a government loyalty board. Because of
this, the vice-president, Greene, was unable to obtain employment in his profession.
Prior to the revocation of the clearance, Greene was allowed to know the evidence
on which the government's charges rested - the reports of secret investigators.
Central to the charges was Greene's association with a number of Russian embassy
officials, evidence of which was compiled from the records of the FBI. Greene
was not allowed to confront his accusers, nor to cross-examine them. On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed, on the grounds that the Defense Department was not
explicitly empowered by the President or Congress to deprive Greene of the ability
to follow his chosen profession' 5 in a proceeding in which he was not accorded the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination. 6
This "lack of authority" argument has been used by the Court before. In
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,17 the Court stated that the
executive order under which the Attorney General had purported to act did not
confer authority upon him to arbitrarily place three organizations on a list of
groups designated by him as communist-dominated. In other cases, the Court has
prevented removal of government employees on security grounds, because the
action was taken without proper "authorization.""' Even where regulations pro-
mulgated by officials subordinate to the President are involved, the Court has
insisted they be strictly followed.' 9
Its own members have suggested that the Supreme Court has twisted this
"authorization" issue and used it as a means to circumvent the constitutional prob-
lems involved.2 0 Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Greene, stated that "[T]he action
of the Court in striking down the program for lack of specific authorization is indeed
strange." 2
1
Fundamental to a decision of the constitutional issues presented by the present
case is a finding that a person's interest in holding a particular job is entitled to
the protection of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. It would appear
9 Bailey v. Richardson, supra note 7, at 57.
10 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
11 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
12 Rauh, supra note 3, at 1179. It is of interest to note that Mr. Justice Black, 349 U.S.
at 349 (concurring opinion), was of the opinion that the constitutional questions should have
been dealt with and Mr. Justice Douglas, 349 U.S. at 350 (concurring opinion), went on to
decide those questions in favor of Doctor Peters.
13 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
14 Id. at 508.
15 As a direct consequence of this action, Mr. Greene was forced to leave an $18,000
per year job and obtain employment which paid him $4,700 per year.
16 360 U.S. 474,508 (1959).
17 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (opinion of Justices Burton and Douglas) Justices Frankfurter,
Black and Jackson, all concurred separately.
18 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Peters v.
Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
19 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
20 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). "In our opinion, the clear purpose of the Con-
gress . .. is frustrated . . ." (Mr. Justice Clark, with whom Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice
Minton join, dissenting.). Id. at 565.
21 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 515 (1959). (dissenting opinion).
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that it is, 2 although it has been said that no one has a right to a government job.23
In one case in 1915, dealing with 'the fourteenth amendment, the Court said that
the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community
is the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the Amendment to protect.
24
Similarly, in Peters v. Hobby,
The practice of using faceless informers has spread through a vast domain
. . . It is an un-American practice which we should condemn. It deprives
men of "liberty" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for one of
man's most precious liberties is his right to work. When a man is deprived
of that "liberty" without a fair trial, he is denied due process. 25
Both these cases dealt with debarments from work in general, or from a whole field
of employment. Concededly, they do not argue for the existence of a "liberty" or
"property" right in a given job. However, in Greene v. McElroy, the court said, per
Warren, C. J.:
[Tihe right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen pro-
fession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the
"liberty" and "property" concepts of the Fifth Amendment.2 6
This established, the next question presented is, "Was Mrs. Brawner deprived
of her 'liberty' or 'property' without due process of law?" She was certainly de-
prived of her job by the Government's action. The court in Cafeteria Wkrs. sug-
gests that "[T]his is not a discharge case." 27 In the light of the fact that the Gov-
ernment, through the Naval Security Officer, denied Mrs. Brawner access to her
job, and prevented her from being of any use to her employer at that job, it is
hard to see how this contention can be sustained.
It is submitted that the summary way in which Mrs. Brawner was deprived
of her job violates due process. It is tautological to say that "due process" means
"fair procedure"; it has been held that fairness of procedure is "ingrained in our
national traditions and is designed to maintain them."2 8 Procedural safeguards
against arbitrary governmental action have manifested themselves throughout the
history of Western civilization, 29 particularly in the common law.30
It would certainly appear that essential to fairness of procedure is the op-
portunity to meet the evidence upon which one is accused. As the Court said
in Greene v. McElroy:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individ-
ual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evi-
dence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the indi-
vidual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.3s
22 Cf. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Powell v. Pennsylvania 127 U.S. 678
(1888).
23 Bailey v. Richardson, supra note 7, at 57.
24 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,41 (1915) (14th Amendment).
25 349 U.S. 331, 351-52 (1955). And, in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,192 (1952),
it was said:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employ-
ment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend
to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbi-
trary or discriminatory.
26 Greene v. McElroy, supra note 21, at 492.
27 284 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert, granted, 364 U.S. 843 (1960).
28 JAFRC v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring)
(cases cited).
29 Chief Justice Warren, in a discussion of the "ancient roots" of procedural due process,
cites the Bible:
It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that
which he is accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to
answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him. Acts 25:16.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
30 See 5 WIosOaE, EVMENCE § 1367 (3d Ed. 1940).
31 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
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The majority in Cafeteria Wkrs. distinguishes Greene on the grounds that what
the government did to Greene was "total debarment" from his chosen occupa-
tion,32 and that Greene strictly held only that government officers must be "au-
thorized" to employ summary procedures. 33 It is suggested that there is more to
Greene than that.
Can it be fairly said that the action of the government in revoking Mrs.
Brawner's security badge did not seriously injure her? At first, it would appear
that all that has happened to her is a job lost - and she has already been
offered another job by her employer. However, there is more. Although, as the
court said in Cafeteria Wkrs., "Nobody has said that Brawner is disloyal, or is
suspected of the slightest shadow of intentional wrongdoing,"3 4 Mr. Justice Black,
in the oral argument on Mrs. Brawner's appeal (yet pending), drew from the
government's counsel the admission that on any application for a government
job Mrs. Brawner would have to note that she had been employed at the cafeteria.35
It is not far-fetched to presume that questions would be asked about her reasons
for leaving the job, and that her answer of "security reasons" could conceivably
prejudice her. There can be little doubt as to the stigma commonly attaching to
one dismissed from a job for "security reasons"; the Supreme Court itself said in
Wieman v. Updegraff:3 6 "There can be no dispute about the consequences visited
upon a person excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In view
of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of
infamy. 3
7
Although it is true that Mrs. Brawner was not accused of "disloyalty," it
is to be wondered whether the "community" spoken of in Wieman v. Updegraff
would bother to make the cautious distinction between "disloyal" persons and
mere "security risks." Since Mrs. Brawner was not told by the government why
she was no longer "secure," she could not meet the accusation of disloyalty if it
were leveled.
Since Mrs. Brawner may be seriously injured by the government's action in
revoking her security badge, it would seem that the very least the government
ought to have done was to inform her why the badge was revoked.
Greene was, in fact," subjected to a much worse injury than Mrs. Brawner
has been. But, conversely, the security authorities told him the substance of the
charges against him.3 Yet the Supreme Court called the procedure in his case
"of questionable constitutionality" because he could not confront or cross-examine
his accusers.39 Certainly a procedure in which a security badge was revoked with
no hearing at all is of even more questionable constitutionality.
Thus it is concluded that Mrs. Brawner was deprived of her job without
due process of law. She was denoted a "security risk," or if that terminology
is too strong, she was denoted unfit to enter government property "for security
reasons," without any opportunity to even know why. The issue here is not con-
frontation or cross-examination; it is more basic: it is the right to know why
the government has found a citizen a danger to its security.
Prescinding from the constitutional issue, it is submitted that the security
officer was not authorized, in the Greene sense, to deprive Mrs. Brawner of her
badge and her job in such a manner. In finding that the Navy was authorized
by the President to revoke Mrs. Brawner's badge, the court in Cafeteria Wkrs.
32 284 F.2d 173, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted 364 U.S. 843 (1960).
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 183.
35 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (U.S., Jan. 17, 1961).
36 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
37 Id. at 190.
38 360 U.S. 474, 484 (1960).
39 Id. at 506.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
dealt with the problem entirely in terms of the government's right to control egress
and ingress to its own property.40 Greene can also be said to involve egress and
ingress to government property. In that case, the "property" consisted of official
secrets. Yet the bare right of the government to keep people off its property is not
at issue here. The issue is much more specific: can the government deprive a woman
of her job using a procedure where she was not given the opportunity to know
the evidence on which the government based its conclusion? It is in these terms
that the Supreme Court in Greene phrased its issue. And in these terms the Su-
preme Court held that any official who acts in this "area of doubtful consti-
tutionality" must do so under direct, explicit authorization from either the President
or Congress. The authorization must be as to the manner, not merely as to the
object; the means, not the end. And nowhere in the chain of Navy regulations
quoted in Cafeteria Wkrs. does there appear any mention of the type of pro-
cedure to be used in revoking security badges, where such action will lead to
the loss of a job.
The purpose of the requirement of authorization in "areas of questionable
constitutionality" is not merely "to assure that individuals are not deprived of
cherished rights under procedures not actually authorized," 4 1 but further,
because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality,
requires careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enact-
ing and implementing our laws. Without explicit action by lawmakers,
decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by
default to administrators who, under our system of government, are not
endowed with authority to decide them. 42
Even those who do not agree with the conclusion that the procedure employed
to deprive Mrs. Brawner of her job was unconstitutional can hardly argue that
it was not "in the area of doubtful constitutionality"; once in that area, it is sub-
mitted, the government cannot act unless and until the procedure it is to follow
is explicitly and clearly outlined by those in positions of ultimate authority -
Congress or the President.
In conclusion, then, the court in Cafeteria Wkrs. Local v. McElroy seems to
have erred. Mrs. Brawner was deprived of her job in a proceeding which was
arguably unconstitutional; if the proceeding was not unconstitutional, it was surely
within the area of doubtful constitutionality deemed by the Supreme Court to
require explicit Presidential or Congressional authorization for government action.
Such explicit authorization is not present. It is reiterated that nowhere in the chain
of regulations, from the President to the Security Officer who revoked Mrs.
Brawner's badge, does there appear any mention whatever of the procedures to
be used in depriving people of their badges and their jobs for "security reasons."
It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will use this case to clarify the
standards by which the government is to operate its security program. It is con-
ceded that this is a trying task, involving the necessity of designing a fair process
which will not disrupt the government's efforts to prevent infiltration by Russian
agents. It is obvious that requiring the government to disclose all its evidence,
or all its informers, in every security proceeding will involve a great cost in un-
dercover agents and confidential informers; on the other hand, secrecy - especial-
ly of the sort of which the present case is an example - renders the individual
subject not only to false accusations, but also to arbitrary government power. In
the words of Adolf Berle,
The danger is the ancient one of irresponsible power, functioning outside
the discipline of law implicit in organized government. Because the issue
[arises] over Communists, who are deservedly unpopular, its real nature has
not been clearly apprehended. 43
40 284 F.2d 173, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted 364 U.S. 843 (1960).
41 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959).
42 Ibid.
43 BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, 105-06 (1954). For general
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However, given the apparent lack of authority in the Security Officer to de-
prive Mrs. Brawner of her badge, it is probable that this case will be decided
on the "authority" issue alone.* Frank P. Maggio
CRIMINAL LAw - DURHAM RULE - DISSATISFACTION WITH THE OPERATION
OF THE DURHAM RULE EXPRESSED BY THREE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.- Comer Blocker was convicted of murder in
the first degree and sentenced to death for the shotgun killing of his common law
wife. Insanity had been his principal defense. He appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Held: reversed, two judges dis-
senting. In order to find Blocker not guilty by reason of insanity, the jury need
not make an affirmative finding that his alleged unlawful act was the product of
a mental disease or defect. Blocker v. United States, No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March
3, 1961.
The law in the District of Columbia is that once some evidence of insanity
is introduced, the burden is on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the act was not the product of a mental disease or mental defect.1 Blocker v.
United States in itself is not especially significant, however, except perhaps as an
illustration of the close scrutiny which the Court of Appeals has applied since
Durham v. United States2 in 1954 to convictions where the defense is insanity.
While the decision itself adds little to pre-existing law, the opinions rendered,
especially the concurring opinion of Judge Burger, warrant comment because of
what was said about the operation of the Durham rule.3 In commenting upon the
Blocker case, mention will also be made of United States v. Naples4, a case decided
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, just six days after
the Blocker decision. Judge Alexander Holtzoff, sitting as the trier of fact, made
certain statements in his opinion which, though dicta, are relevant to the matter
under discussion.
The Durham criterion of the criminal responsibility of persons suffering from
mental disorder at the time of their acts is that an accused is not responsible for
his unlawful act if it was the product of a mental disease or mental defect. Prior
to the Durham decision in 1954, the standard of criminal responsibility used in
the District of Columbia was the McNaghten right-wrong test,5 supplemented since
background information on the security risk problem, and for some enlightening insights into
its policies, see Krasnowiecki, Confrontation of Witnesses in Government Employee Security
Proceedings, 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 180 (1958).
* On June 19, 1961, the Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart
the Court held that the commanding officer of the gun factory was authorized to deny Mrs.
Brawner access to her place of employment. In the absence of legislation, said the Court,
government employment can be revoked at will. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom the Chief
Justice and Justices Black and Douglas joined, attacked both the authorization and the pro-
cedure, in dissent. (Ed.)
1 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
3 In addition to the majority opinion, written by Judge Edgerton, and that of Judge
Burger, opinions were written by Chief Judge Miller, dissenting, with whom Judge Bastian
joined, and by Judge Fahey, who also concurred in the majority opinion.
4 Criminal No. 91-59, D.D.C., March 9, 1961.
5 McNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843):
[To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labor-
ing under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
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1929 by the so-called "irresistible impulse" test.6 The Durham criterion has been
the subject of a great deal of comment7 and debate. Many writers, both medical
and legal, have hailed its adoption as a progressive measure. 8 But every court out-
side the District of Columbia which has had Durham pressed upon it has rejected
it,0 and it exists today only in the District.'"
The significance of Blocker is its indication that at least three of the nine
Judges of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are dissatisfied with
the operation of the Durham rule and think that it ought to be changed. Judge
Burger said this in his concurring opinion. The two dissenting judges agreed with
him. But Judge Burger, though calling Durham a wrong step, took care to say that
it was in the right direction because it sought to open the jury's inquiry to include
the ever-increasing knowledge of the human mind and personality.
, The balance of this article will be devoted to listing Judge Burger's objections,
analyzing them, and suggesting what steps might be taken to alleviate the dissatis-
faction of the three judges, and at the same time improve the administration of the
Durham rule and perhaps make it more acceptable to other jurisdictions.
Judge Burger's objection to the Durham rule can be said to rest on four points.
First, instructions to the jury under Durham ignore the elements of cognition and
capacity to control behavior, although the basic postulate of criminal law is that
man is endowed with free will and choice and is held responsible for those acts
which he has knowingly chosen to do. Second, the term "mental disease" is
dangerously vague to be a critical element of the rule of criminal responsibility.3"
It has never been judicially defined, he says, and thus its legal meaning is left to
medical men, and changes from psychiatrist to psychiatrist. Furthermore, its mean-
ing to certain psychiatrists changed "over a week-end,"'12 says Judge Burger, altering
the scope of the Durham rule to embrace a number of people and problems-
sociopaths (psychopaths) - that were not contemplated when the rule was adopted.
Third, the rule invites expert witnesses to give conclusory opinions, i.e., whether
or not the defendant had a mental disease or whether or not his act was the product
of his mental disease, instead of emphasizing medical reasons and explanations.
Such testimony is naturally persuasive with the jury, and moreover, states Judge
Burger, the Court of Appeals has given excessive weight to expert testimony and
has not allowed the jury to disregard it even if it sees fit to do so.' 3 Thus the
fact-finding function of the jury is at least partially usurped. Fourth, the almost
inevitable conflict among expert witnesses as to whether or not a "mental disease"
6 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929):
The mere ability to distinguish right from wrong is no longer the correct
test either in civil or criminal cases, where the defense of insanity is inter-
posed. The accepted rule . . .is that the accused must be capable, not only
of distinguishing between right and wrong, but that he was not impelled
to do the act by an irresistible impulse, which means before it will justify
a verdict of acquittal that his reasoning powers were so far dethroned by
his diseased mental condition as to deprive him of the will power to resist
the insane impulse to perpetrate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong.
7 30 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 305 (1955).
8 See e.g., Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and
Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955); Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened justice, 22 U. CHI.
L. REv. 331 (1955). Some writers were critical of Durham, however. E.g.: Hall, Responsi-
bility and the Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956); Wertham,
Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 336 (1955).
9 No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March 3, 1961. Judge Burger's footnote in his concurring
opinion, sets out the federal and state courts which have rejected Durham.
10 New Hampshire has a quite similar rule, however. See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399
(1869); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
11 See De Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHl. L. RBv. 339 (1955).
12 United States v. Blocker, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Blocker was twice convicted
of murder; this case concerns the reversal of his first conviction.
13 Judge Burger cites Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956), as hold-
ing that a case is left in the hands of the jury only if there is disagreement among the psy-
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existed and whether or not an act was its "produce' engender doubt. Add to
this the excessive weight given medical testimony, and the government's burden,
once some evidence of insanity is introduced, 14 of proving the defendant's sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 (i.e., that his unlawful act was not the product of a
mental disease), and the burden upon the prosecution becomes enormous. In fact
Judge Burger states that the time is not too far distant when the Supreme Court
must re-examine Davis v. United States, 6 which places the burden of proof on
the government on the issue of insanity,'7 in light of the fact that many psychiatrists
see doubt about the mental capacity in every person who commits a serious criminal
act. It is Judge Burger's thesis that the combination of the Durham "disease-
produce, jury instructions, which ignore the defendant's capacity of choice and
free will, and the excessive weight given by the Court of Appeals to expert testi-
mony, superimposed upon the Davis burden of proof, has operated
to reject the historic basis of criminal responsibility and to substitute some-
thing resembling the 'determinist' thesis that man's conduct is simply a
manifestation of irresistible psychological forces in which ethical and moral
values and standards play small part, if any part.' 8
Before analyzing these objections,' 9 it seems helpful to recall the basis of
exculpation from criminal responsibility because of mental disorder. According to
legal tradition, a crime consists of an unlawful act plus another element which is
variously called "guilty mind," "mens rea," criminal intent, etc. 20 Without the
concurrence of both elements there is no crime and can be no punishment. Accord-
ingly, the traditional view of the law has been that a person suffering from menial
disorder to a given extent should not be held responsible for his acts which result
from that disorder. Just what quantum of mental disorder and causal relationship
with respect to an unlawful act should result in exculpation from criminal responsi-
bility is a legal problem, but one closely bound up with the standards of moral
accountability which are held by the public. As the public view of the moral
accountability of persons suffering from mental disorder changes, due to public
awareness and acceptance of increasing scientific knowledge, the legal standards
of responsibility must change, although perhaps it must always lag behind. With
that in mind, it is evident that the law will probably lag much further behind the
standard of moral accountability held by psychiatrists. Thus their protests of anti-
quarianism are to be expected. This is not to say that the law should not try to
catch up. No matter what standard of criminal responsibility is currently in use,
chiatrists or if the expert testimony supports guilt. This seems to overstate the case some-
what as Judge Fahey's concurring opinion in Blocker suggests. On the subject of weight
accorded psychiatric testimony generally, see Broderick, The Role of the Psychiatrist and
Psychiatric Testimony in Civil and Criminal Trials, 35 NoTR DAME LAWYER 508 (1960).
14 Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
15 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1.895).
16 Ibid.
17 In United States v. Naples, Criminal No. 91-59, D.D.C., March 9, 1961, an interesting
theory is put forth on the burden of proof on the issue of insanity in the District of Columbia.
It is suggested that Section 24-301 of the District of Columbia Code, 69 Sat. 609 (1955),
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII 1960), which makes commitment to a mental insti-
tution mandatory upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, evidenced a legislative
intent to put the burden of proof on the defendant, for only then would the jury have to
make an affirmative finding of insanity to acquit by reason of insanity. The reasoning is
that Congress would not provide for mandatory commitment without an affirmative finding
of insanity. This would seem to be a case of the tail wagging the dog, however.
18 Blocker v. United States, No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March 3, 1961.
19 Chief Judge Miller, dissenting in the Blocker case, and Judge Holtzoff in United
States v. Naples, state the argument that Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897), laid
down as a rule for the federal courts, that the test of criminal responsibility was the right-
wrong plus irresistible-impulse test. This would seem to be a moot point as far as the Dis-
trict of Columbia goes, after seven years of Durham. Besides, although the court in Davis
approved such a definition of he test of responsibility as not prejudicial, it did not say that
it was the only test to be used.
20 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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however, where an unlawful act is committed by a person suffering from a mental
disorder so serious and so related to the act that under the standard in use he is
exculpated from responsibility, then that person simply has not committed a crime.
It follows that under a jury system any criminal punishment for an act is violative
of due process of law unless the defendant has been found by the jury to fall
within the law's standard of accountability. Since accountability is so closely
related to morals it is well that a panel of the public decide.2'
When the Court of Appeals adopted the Durham rule in 1954 they intended
to modify the legal criterion of responsibility to conform more closely with modem
psychiatric knowledge. If an act is the "product" of a mental disease or defect,
says Durham, the actor is not criminally responsible. It is the requisite causal rela-
tionship which "product" implies, and how that meaning is conveyed to the jury,
that is the crux of Judge Burger's objection to the Durham rule. It was not until
Carter v. United States2 2 that the Court of Appeals delivered a thorough discussion
of the meaning of "product." There the court stated some 'basic philosophy:
If a man is 'amens (id est) sine mente' in respect to an act to such an
extent that in doing the act he is not a free agent, or not making a choice,
or unknowing of the difference between right and wrong, or not choosing
freely, or not acting freely, he is outside the postulate of the law of
punishment. An insane man is not held responsible, because he has not
a criminal mind in respect to the act he committed. That philosophy has
never changed, and it is not proposed to change it now. The problem
. . . is one of translating the accepted philosophy into practical rules of
action for everyday use in the courtroom.
23
Here, says Judge Burger, the court recognized the shortcomings of the disease-
product test, when it tried to explain it in the very terms the law had used prior
to 1954, i.e., the capacity to exercise free will and choice. But Judge Burger objects
that the jury is still left in the dark. The jury is not told that the defendant's
mental disease exculpates him only if it affected him so substantially that his
capacity for free will and choice was destroyed-that he could not appreciate
the nature of his act or could not control his conduct. Durham-rule jury instruc-
tions do not place before the jury the elements of cognition and capacity to control
behavior. They are worded only in terms of whether or not the act was the
product of, or result of, or caused by a mental disease.
Judge Burger insists that according to moral and legal tradition an act cannot
possibly be the product of a mental disease unless the effect of the disease is to sub-
stantially destroy the actor's cognitional or volitional capacity,2 4 and the jury must
be instructed accordingly. It does no good, he says, to acknowledge this in an
appellate opinion (Carter) and then couch the jury instructions merely in terms
of "product," for under a jury system the standard of criminal responsibility is no
more than the test which is conveyed to the jury. The judge states that the Carter
opinion affords perhaps the best basis for an amended jury instruction; he sets
forth such an instruction, which reads in part:
To hold him guilty the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, both
that he understood and appreciated the act charged was a violation of
law and that he possessed the capacity or competence to choose to do it
or refrain from doing it.
2 5
This instruction sounds much like the McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse
test. The crucial question, and one which his opinion does not answer unequivocally,
is whether Judge Burger would demand complete incapacitation, as the old test
does, or would simply require substantial impairment of the defendant's cognitional
or volitional capacity as grounds for an acquittal by reason of insanity. The other
21 See Royal Commission on 'Capital Punishment, 1949-53, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932
(1953).
22 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
23 Id. at 616. (Footnotes omitted.)
24 See Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CmI. L. Rzv. 336 (1955).
25 No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March 3, 1961.
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alternative proposals which Judge Burger sets out as a substitute fo the disease-
product rule do not clear up this ambiguity; one is a modified right-wrong-irre-
sistible-impulse test.2" The other two formulations, one of which is that provided
by the proposed Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute,27 hold that
substantial impairment of capacity would be sufficient to exculpate.
It seems that the dissenting judges in Blocker and Judge Holtzoff in United
States v. Naples are of the opinion that if Durham changed the pre-1954 test it
should be overruled. Judge Miller, dissenting in Blocker, states, "To be an excuse
from criminal responsibility the disease must have been such as to destroy the ability
to understand what is right and what is wrong, or to take away the actor's mental
power to control his own actions." 2s Judge Holtzoff uses the same reasoning-
that an act is not the product of a mental disease unless the disease destroyed the
actor's ability to distinguish between right and wrong or to adhere to the right.
He concludes that actually the two tests are equivalent. 29
Clearly, the Durham court did not intend that complete destruction of cogni-
tion would be necessary to exculpate. The causal relationship meant to be conveyed
by "product" was explained in Carter:
[W]e mean to convey the idea inherent in the phrases 'because of,' 'except
for,' 'without which,' 'but for,' 'effect of,' . . . that 'But for this disease
the act would not have been committed.'30
It is submitted that the operation of the Durham rule would be improved,
and virtually all of Judge Burger's objections removed, if the jury instruction
were phrased as follows:
You must find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity unless the
Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant
was not suffering from a medically recognized mental abnormality at the
time of his unlawful act, or that the unlawful act was not the product of
the mental abnormality. An act is the product of a mental abnormality if
as a result of the abnormality the actor lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of his act or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.3'
Regardless what type of mental disorder is discovered by medical men tomor-
row or 20 years from now, how can one suffering from the disorder be deemed
not responsible for his act unless the effect of the disorder is to impair substantially
his cognitional capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or his volitional
capacity to conform his conduct to the law? As for what constitutes substantial
impairment, that is for the jury to say.
One might question the importance of placing the elements of cognition and
volition expressly before the jury since these are the elements which they will con-
26 Based upon Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4) (1956):(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
See note 32, infra, in regard to the other alternative formulation.
28 No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March 3, 1961. See also. Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d
368 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
29 United States v. Naples, Criminal No. 91-59, D.D.C., March 9, 1961. See also
United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1957).
30 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. 'Cir. 1956).
31 This formulation of the test of responsibility is substantially that suggested by the
Committee on Criminal Responsibility of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia;
Report, 26 D.C.B.A.J. 301 (1959), and expressed by Judge Burger. It is thought to be an
improvement upon the Model Penal Code formulation, supra, note 28. The addition of the
word "wrongfulness" clearly exculpates the individual who knows that his act is regarded
as criminal yet hears "voices from God" telling him to do it. The term "mental abnormality"
is broad enough to include sociopathy; there is no reason why sociopaths should not be
exculpated, it seems, if their cognitional or volitional capacity is substantially impaired. See
Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 85-90 (1956).
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sider anyway in deciding whether the act was the product of a disease. (It seems
that when a juryman is deciding whether a defendant should be held responsible
he asks the question, "Did he know what he was doing?" and "Could he help
himself?") But it is important to place these elements before the jury expressly.
This will ensure that the jury retain its function as the finder of facts. It is sub-
mitted that one of the chief defects in the operation of the Durham rule in the
District of Columbia has been that the Court of Appeals has at times acted as the
ultimate trier of fact, reversing convictions when it does not agree with the jury
as to the value of expert testimony. 32 This has been made possible by the reasonable
doubt which Judge Burger states is invited under the Durham rule wherever
insanity is a defense. It would be much more difficult for an appellate court to
hold that the prosecution did not sustain its burden of proof and that reasonable
men could not convict, where the jury's task is to determine whether the defendant's
capacity was substantially impaired. The following passage from a pre-Durham
opinion is most relevant:
Had there been an equivalent conflict of testimony about the actual
commission of the offense it might well be that the verdict could not
stand. But the issue of the criminal responsibility of a defendant suffering
from a mental disease is not an issue of fact in the same sense .... The
application of these tests, [of responsibility] however they are phrased, to
a borderline case can be nothing more than a moral judgment that it isjust or unjust to blame the defendant for what he did .... The institution
which applies our inherited ideas of moral responsibility to individuals
prosecuted for crime is a jury of ordinary men. . . .After they have de-
clared by their verdict that they have no such doubt [of defendant's sanity]
their judgment should not be disturbed on the ground that it is contrary
to expert psychiatric opinion.33
The Durham court quoted an excerpt from the same opinion: "Our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame."3 4 It would
seem that at times the Court of Appeals has substituted its "collective conscience"
for that of the jury. It must be noted, however that in a recent case, Martin v.
United States,35 where substantial expert testimony on the probability and possi-
bility of defendant's having been insane was introduced, the conviction was allowed
to stand. This could be an indication that in the future the Court of Appeals may
be less inclined to find reasonable doubt as to defendants' sanity as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals might object to the jury instruction here proposed on
the ground that it requires, for exculpation, a causality more stringent than the
"but for" type of causality which was described in Carter. Some comments of
Professor Wechsler go right to the heart of the matter:
The difficulty of this [Durham] formulation inheres in the ambiguity of
'product.' If interpreted to lead to irresponsibility unless the defendant
would have engaged in the criminal conduct even if he had not suffered
from the disease or defect, it is too broad: an answer that he would have
done so can be given very rarely; this is intrinsic to the concept of the
singleness of personality and unity of mental processes that psychiatry
regards as fundamental."s
It is submitted that the use of "but for" to describe the causal relationship requisite
to exculpate merely beclouds the crucial question, i.e., whether the effect of the
abnormality was to substantially impair the defendant's cognitional or volitional
capacity. Although in many cases the use of "but for" probably would not change
the result, it might do so in the case of the sociopathic personality disturbance.
Criminal behavior and an anti-social attitude are among the chief manifestations
32 See Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright v. United
States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir.
1956); cf. Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
33 Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
34 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
35 284 F,2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
36 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956) at 159.
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of such an abnormality. It could perhaps be said, then, that but for -the abnormality
a certain criminal act would not have occurred. Yet a jury might find that the
actor's cognitional and volitional capacities had not been substantially impaired
as a result of the abnormality.
It is further submitted that the adoption of the suggested jury instruction
could remove virtually all of Judge Burger's objections to the operation of the
Durham rule. No longer would the courts have to wrestle with the term "disease."
The broad term "medically recognized mental abnormality" can be used because
the proposed instruction concentrates on the effect of the disorder, not its existence.
The criterion of exculpation should not be the seriousness of the disorder, but its
effect on the defendant. As to what constitutes a medically recognized disorder,
that must be left to the jury, informed by effective expert testimony. This leads
to another of Judge Burger's objections, that expert witnesses should not give con-
clusory opinions. It seems that expert witnesses should be allowed to give their
opinion as to questions that the jury ultimately must decide. The jury should be
allowed to get the benefit of such opinion if the expert cares to give it. But the
jury must also be allowed to weigh it, and accept or reject it. Furthermore, the
salutary admonition in Carter must be heeded: that the chief value of expert testi-
mony lies not in expressions of conclusion, but in description and explanation of
the origin, development and manifestations of the alleged abnormality, and its effect
upon the defendant.3 7 Psychiatrists have complained that existing tests of criminal
responsibility tend to force them to make moral judgments. This is a valid com-
plaint, it seems, and the proposed instruction attempts to leave such judgments to
the jury. It may be objected that capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness or crim-
inality of an act and -to conform conduct to law are psychiatric concepts. That
may unfortunately be true, it is doubtful that the necessary translation that must
be made, as long as the jury system is retained, between psychiatric concepts and
those with which a jury must deal can be made easy under any test of responsibility.
It is hoped that some change will be made in the jury instructions given in the
District of Columbia, so that they will take into account capacity for free will and
choice. This would prevent what Judge Burger fears is almost a deterministic
approach to responsibility and would ensure that the jury continue to determine
responsibility according to moral and legal tradition and in the light of current
scientific knowledge.
The last paragraph of the majority opinion implies that other judges of the
court are concerned with certain practices in the administration of the Durham
rule.38 The author of the Durham opinion stated recently, however, that what is
required, "is not so much a new and better jury instruction as a better presentation
of the facts by the expert witnesses, and a deepened appreciation of what they
are saying by all parties concerned. . . ."39 Perhaps the appeal from the conviction
in United States v. Naples (which the 1rial court directed defendant's court-
appointed counsel to make) will provide a forum for further discussion in light
of the fact that Judge Holtzoff, who was the trier of facts, stated that the Durham
rule and the right-wrong-irresistible-impulse test are equivalent.
Paul Driscoll
37 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
38 No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March 3, 1961:
Appellant's court-appointed counsel has expressed deep concern that certain
practices in the administration of the rule of criminal responsibility which
this court adopted in 1954 endanger its broadened purposes. In dealing
with these matters in a number of previous cases we have expressed similar
concern. We think the present case does not present a useful context for
further discussion of these matters.
39 Address by Judge David L. Bazelon at the Law School of The University of Chicago,
April 19, 1961.
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INCOME TAX - FEDERAL - DEDUCTIONS - AMORTIZABLE PREMIUM ON
BONDS GIVEN To CHIARITABLE CORPORATION Is DEDUCTIBLE. - On September
'22, 1953, petitioner purchased $100,000 (principal amount) of 3% per cent
Appalachian Electric Power Co. bonds due June 1, 1981. The purchase price
of the bonds was 1148 and the total cost to petitioner was $115,843.75, including
commission and accrued .interest. The bonds were subject to call on thirty days
notice at 100 plus a special redemption premium of 2 Y8 per cent. Petitioner bor-
rowed $100,000 of the purchase price of the bonds from a bank, paying the balance
from its own funds, and gave the bank its promissory note for $100,000, dated
September 30, 1953, due 35 days after date, with interest at 3 per cent. The
bonds were held by the bank as collateral payment of the loan.
On October 23, 1953, petitioner recorded on its books an amortization of
the premium paid for the bonds in the amount of $12,250 (cost plus commission
less call price) which it deducted on its income tax return for the fiscal year as
part of its general and administrative expenses.
On October 26, 1953, petitioner made a gift of the bonds, subject to petitioner's
indebtedness to the bank, to the Maysteel Foundation, a charitable corporation
set up by the stockholders of Maysteel Products. The Foundation sold the bonds on
October 27, 1953, for $119,000, and repaid the loan. Petitioner also claimed a
deduction for the charitable contribution in the amount of $17,131.49.
The Commissioner retroactively disallowed both the claimed deductions. On
review, the full Tax Court reversed in part, allowing the charitable deduction, and
affirmed the Comissioner's disallowance of the bond premium deduction., On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held:
reversed, as to the disallowance of the bond premium deduction. The transaction
here had economic substance and was not a sham nor rigged device without
real substance or risk; the inducement or motive is without significance. Maysteel
Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 2401 (February 27, 1961).
Section 23(v) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provides for deduction
of "amortizable bond premium,' '2 the provisions for computation of which are set
out in section 125 of that Code.'
An examination of legislative history discloses that the purpose of section 125
was to remedy what Congress determined to be a tax inequality between holders
of bonds on which the interest is taxable and holders of bonds upon which the
interest is exempt from taxation.4 "Bond premium" is the price paid for a bond
in excess of its par value. Generally, this extra amount is paid for the bond be-
cause of its high interest rate and/or attractive stock conversion features. Part of
this higher interest return paid to the bondholder, then, is actually "installment"
recovery of capital expended for the high interest rate. But prior to the 1942
1 33 T.C. 1021 (March 17, 1960).
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §23(v), 56 Stat. 1:
Deductions from gross income . . . In computing net income there shall
be allowed as deductions:
(1) Bond Premium Deduction. In the case of a bondholder, the de-
duction for amortizable bond premium provided in section 125.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §125(b)(1)(2), 56 Stat. 1 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 §171(b)):
Amortizable Bond Premium .. .
(b)(1) Amount of Bond Premium . . . shall be determined with
reference to the amount of the basis (for determining loss
on sale or exchange) of such bond, and with reference to the
amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date ...
(2) Amount Amortizable. The amortizable bond premium of the
taxable year shall be the amount of the bond premium attribut-
able to such year.
4 88 CONG. REC. 6377 (1942); H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1942-2
Cum. BULL. 372, 410.
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amendment to the Internal Revenue Code (section 125), bond premium was
treated as capital loss sustained by the owner of the bond at the time of disposition
or maturity, and periodic payments on the bond at the nominal or coupon rate
were treated in full as interest.
The holder of a taxable security was in the unfortunate position of being
taxed on the interest at high rates and of receiving a capital loss upon redemp-
tion, which was only deductible as an offset against gains from sales or exchanges
of capital assets,5 while the holder of a tax-exempt security was in the unique
position of being relieved of tax on the interest paid on the bond and of re-
ceiving a deductible loss upon redemption or other disposition of the security to
the extent of the premium.6
Recognizing that the yield (interest minus bond premium) rather than the
actual interest rate reflected the true income of the taxpayer, Congress, through
section 125(a) (1) (2) 7 gave to holders of interest-taxable bonds the option to
spread the capital loss through the years of interest payments up to the callable
date of the bonds. It denied this right to holders of tax-exempt bonds.
Since the practical effect of section 125 is to eliminate the risk of loss of
the premium paid for the bonds, Congress must have contemplated that the bond-
holder would be subjected to the possibility of such a loss at either disposition
or maturity. Thus, a disposition of the bonds in such a manner as to eliminate,
as a practical matter, the possibility of loss, would be a frustration of the Con-
gressional policy underlying the act.
The majority in Maysteel saw the primary question before it as whether or
not the transaction entered into by petitioner had "economic substance." In a
brief opinion the court answered this question in the affirmative, reasoning that
while the end result here was a gift - not a business transaction - the bond
purchase, loan, note and pledge of collateral, sale of the bonds and satisfaction
of the loan were in every respect genuine financial and commercial transactions
which exposed the taxpayer to genuine risks and obligations beyond its control.
It is submitted that the court, in concluding that the transaction had "eco-
nomic substance," did not properly apply the standard set down by the Supreme
Court.8 It is further submitted that "economic substance" was not the dispositive
issue in the case.
The proper inquiry in a determination of the presence or absence of "eco-
nomic substance" is not whether the facts indicate a genuine financial and com-
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §117(d)(1) 53 Stat. 1 (now INT. RV. CODE OF
1954 §§165(f), 1211(a)):
Capital Gains and Losses ...(d) Limitations on Capital losses ...
(1) Corporations ... losses from sales or exchanges of capital
assets shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such
sales or exchanges.
6 Supra, note 4.
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §125(a) (1) (2), 56 Stat. 1 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 §171(a) (1) (2) ):
Amortizable Bond Premium.
(a) General Rule.
(1) Interest wholly or partially taxable. In the case of a bond (other
than a bond the interest on which is excludable from gross
income), the amount of the amortizable bond premium for the
taxable year shall be allowed as a deduction.
(2) Interest wholly tax-exempt. In the case of any bond the
interest on which is excludable from gross income, no deduc-
tion shall be allowed for the amortizable bond premium for
the taxable year.
8 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
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mercial transaction, but whether something is to be gained by the taxpayer beyond
a tax deduction.9
In Gregory v. Helveringe° the Court said: "no doubt a new and valid cor-
poration was created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance
to the end last described (to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the taxpayer).
It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed ... no other
function."1 1 The facts state that the whole transaction in the present case was
proposed to the taxpayer, and carried out on its behalf, by an investment broker
who was soliciting business of clients interested in the cumulative tax benefits of
an amortization deduction and a charitable deduction. It is very difficult to imagine,
therefore, how this transaction could have appreciably affected the petitioner's
economic interest other than to reduce his taxes.
In reasoning to its conclusion that the transaction under scrutiny here had
"economic substance" the majority of the court held that the petitioner incurred
genuine risks and obligations beyond its control. But this would not seem to be
the case. Speaking in general terms, petitioner invested not quite $16,000 of its
own funds in the venture and relied upon the amortization deduction to make
up $12,250 of this amount. It had an equity in the bonds which it could convey
to the Charitable Foundation so long as the value of the bonds did not fall below
par, and stood to realize a profit taxwise so long as the bonds did not devalue
more than ten points, which would be highly unlikely in the short space of time
the bonds were held by petitioner. 12 As long as the bonds remained stable or rose
in value, petitioner could 'hold them at no risk to itself. If the market value of
the bonds began to drop, petitioner could make an immediate conveyance of
the bonds to the Foundation, subject to the debt. There was nothing to prevent
petitioner from conveying the bonds at an earlier time than it actually did, thus
making the possibility of loss all the more slim. So long as the value of the bonds
did not drop below 104 (approx.), the only practical effect the fluctuations of
the market could have would be to increase or decrease the size of the charitable
gift. Under these circumstances, petitioner could not lose.
To grant a capital loss deduction on a bond where as a practical matter there
can be no loss seems inconsistent with all the other provisions of section 23, of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (relating to deductions). An examination
of the various subsections of section 23 shows that all the deductions there allowed
are either expenses of earning the gross income or amounts expended by the tax-
payer which reduce his assets, such as interest on indebtedness.13 Although a
charitable contribution is an amount expended to reduce the taxpayer's assets,
within the scope of section 23, it cannot be successfully maintained that the
premium paid for the bonds in the present case was a deductible expense toward
that goal, since it is clear that nothing was accomplished here (except the tax
deduction) which could not have been accomplished by a simple cash gift to the
Foundation.
Even if the court were to properly find the transaction here to have "eco.
nomic substance," the question which must be answered to dispose of the case
would still remain: "Is this the sort of transaction that the statutory exemption
was intended to cover?"
It is suggested that the majority here would have been greatly aided in arriv-
ing at a sound disposition of this case through the employment of the test proposed
9 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
10 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
11 Id. at 469.
12 See Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959).
13 See 35 NoTRE DAmE LAWYEaR 155 (1959) for extensive discussion of what con-
stitutes "interest" on indebtedness.
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by Judge Learned Hand, dissenting in Gilbert v. Commissioner.'4
To say that (the test) is whether the transaction has 'substantial economic
reality,' or 'is in reality what it appears to be in form' or is a 'sham' or a
'masquerade,' or 'depends upon the substance of the transaction:' all of
these appear to me to leave the test undefined." The question to be an-
swered is, "When the petitioners decided to make their advances in the
form of debts rather than of capital advances, did they suppose that the
difference would appreciably affect their economic interest in the venture
other than taxwise? The burden will then le on them to prove that they
did so suppose.15
The president of petitioner testified that the Corporation planned to pay the
$100,000 loan, when due, through the donee's (Maysteel Foundation's) sale of
the bonds. Since petitioner's 35-day note to the bank was to be paid by the
Foundation from the proceeds of the sale of bonds, the rate of interest could
play no part in determining their purchase price above par. Thus, there was not
to be the return of capital loss year by year from the interest factor as contem-
plated by Congress. 6
The majority held that the transaction here involved meets the literal re-
quirements of the provisions authorizing amortization deductions and that the
motive of tax avoidance is without significance. But, "the question is always
whether the transaction under scrutiny is in reality what it appears to be in form."' 7
"To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the
statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.""'
It would do no more than belabor the obvious to say that a taxpayer has
a legal right to decrease, by means which the law permits, the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes. The question, however, is whether the statute allows
a taxpayer to reduce his taxes by the means petitioner here employed.' 9
Commenting further, Judge Hand says:
The Income Tax Act imposes liabilities upon taxpayers based upon their
financial transactions . . . . If, however, the taxpayer enters into a trans-
action that does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to re-
duce his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot suppose that it was
part of the purpose of the act to provide an escape from the liabilities
it sought to impose.20
The transaction here was without "economic substance" and lay outside the
plain intent of the statute. The decision reached by the majority does not recognize
basic economic realities and it is submitted that an appeal will, and should,
bring a reversal.
Richard H. Puckett, Jr.
LABOR LAw-SUBPOENAS ISSUED UNDER LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT - SECRETARY OF LABOR MUST GIVE REASONS FOR ExAMIN-
ING UNION RECORDS UNDER LMRDA. - The Secretary of Labor issued subpoenas
duces tecum in order to examine records of two unions to determine whether there
had been any violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA). When the Secretary sought enforcement, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Michigan held: Petition for an order to comply
with the subpoenas denied. The Secretary of Labor must show "necessity" for ex-
amining the union records. Labor unions are voluntary associations not subject to
the broad investigatory powers given to the government against corporations.
Mitchell v. Truck Drivers' Local 299, 191 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.Mich. 1961).
14 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
15 Id. at 412 (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
16 Supra, note 4.
17 Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710, 712 (2d Cir. 1936).
18 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
19 Id.
20 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
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The increasing power given to administrative agencies in order to conduct in-
vestigations has had a remarkable development in the last fifty years. At the turn
of the century a government agency could not compel testimony "in order to secure
information to aid in recommending legislation."' The constitutional protections
against search and seizure,2 and self-incrimination3 were held to prohibit agencies
from thus gathering information.
Along with the country's economic and industrial growth, there came a realiza-
tion that Congress and its subordinate agencies had to gather information if ade-
quate legislation were to be drafted. The conflicting interests concerning govern-
ment investigation were re-evaluated and the constitutional protections took on a
considerably different meaning. In 1917,4 the Supreme Court upheld a subpoena
looking into the political expenditures of a railroad. Ten years later' the Court
stated: "[W]e are of the opinion that the power of inquiry-with the process to
enforce it- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."
In Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.7 the Court recognized the
right of an agency to investigate for possible violations of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Acte but held that there had to be "probable cause" before such an in-
vestigation could be conducted. This "no fishing expedition" theory, of Justice
Holmes, persisted in spite of the fact that Congress bestowed broad investigatory
powers on the agencies it created. Seemingly in respect of the wishes of Congress,
the courts began to weaken their position of restricting administrative agencies. In
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling' the Court distinguished between a
"constructive" search and seizure and an actual search and seizure."0 A subpoena,
seeking relevant material, is a "constructive" search and seizure while the aggra-
vating circumstances in American Tobacco was an actual search and seizure."'1
In order to avoid the "probable cause" restriction of American Tobacco, the Okla-
homa Press court utilized the theory that administrative agencies were analogous
to grand juries and could investigate if it "be for a lawfully authorized purpose
and within the power of Congress to command." 2 If there was any doubt that
administrative agencies could investigate without probable cause after Oklahoma
Press, they were erased by United States v. Morton Salt Co.'3 Wherein the Court
stated:
Even if one were to regard the (Federal Trade Commission's) request for
information in this case as nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless
law enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that
corporate behavior is consistent with the law.14
This opinion is indicative of the judicial attitude toward administrative investiga-
tion at the present time."
The court in the Mitchell case refused to enforce the subpoena issued by the
Secretary of Labor because: (1) it was too broad; (2) the extensive power of
investigation given to administrative agencies by Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
1 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 (1911).
2 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
4 Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
5 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
6 Id. at 306.
7 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
8 Id. at 306.
9 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
10 Id. at 204.
11 Id. at 107 n.40.
12 Id. at 209.
13 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
14 Id. at 652.
15 Federal Trade Commission v. Crafts, 335 U.S. 9, reversing per curiam Crafts v. Federal
Trade Commission, 244 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1957); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183,
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
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Walling does not apply to voluntary association; (3) the Secretary must show
probable cause that the LMRDA has been violated because of section 601 of that act.
Section 203 of the LMRDA requires the union to make a financial report to
the Secretary of Labor each year. Section 206 requires the retention of any records
which are pertinent to making that financial report. The subpoena issued in this
case requested essentially the same records required to be kept by the statute.' 6 The
only difference lay in the fact that the subpoena was much more specific in referring
to the records it wished to examine. If the previous statement of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Morton Salt Co. can be applied to voluntary associations as
well as corporations then the subpoena was, apparently, not too broad. There is
dicta in the Morton Salt case that indicated the rule would be applied to a volun-
tary association.' 7 The Mitchell court, however, felt that the Oklahoma Press doc-
trine did not apply to voluntary associations.
Although the Mitchell court decided corporations and voluntary associations are
not equally affected by the Oklahoma Press doctrine, they have been treated alike
in many other areas of the law, viz - for the purpose of venue,'8 service of process,19
and amenability to suit.20 In United States v. White,2 ' the Supreme Court in de-
ciding that a union should not be given the protection of the fifth amendment
commented:
Structurally and functionally, a labor union is an institution which involves
more than the private or personal interests of its members. It represents
organized, institutional activity as contrasted with wholly individual ac-
tivity. This difference is as well defined as that existing between individual
members of the union. The union's existence in fact, and for some pur-
poses in law, is as perpetual as that of any corporation, not being de-
pendent upon the life of any member.... The union engages in a multitude
of business and other official concerted activities, none of which can be said
to le the private undertakings of the members.22
The White case has further significance. There, when union officials claimed the
protection of the fifth amendment in refusing to produce their records, which had
been subpoenaed, the Court said; "we hold, however, that neither the fourth nor
fifth amendment, both of which are directed primarily to the protection of indi-
vidual and personal rights, requires the recognition of a privilege against self-
incrimination under the circumstances of this case." 23 The courts have long recog-
nized the close connection between the fourth and fifth amendments in the area
of compulsory production of records.24 Since the judiciary feels that the fourth
and fifth amendments are both directed toward personal protection and are prac-
tically the same in the area of compelling a person to produce records; it would
seem to follow that, since a union does not have the necessary individuality or
personality to give it the protection of the fifth amendment, it would not have the
necessary individuality for protection under the fourth amendment.
In rejecting any application of the principles of United States v. White to the
16 § 203, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U.S.C. 436:
"Every person required to file under this sub-chapter shall maintain records
on the matters to be reported which will include . . .vouchers, worksheets,
receipts and applicable resolutions ... "
17 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52:
Although the right "to be let alone" . . . is not confined literally to all
searches and seizures as such, but extends to the orderly taking under com-
pulsion of process . . . neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations
can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.
18 Sperry Products v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, 411 (1922).
19 FED. R. Civ. 4b(3); LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61
Stat. 136, § 301(d), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
20 UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
21 322 U.S. 694 (1924).
22 Id. at 701.
23 Id. at 699.
24 "In this regard, the fourth and fifth amendments run into one another." Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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present situation, the district court relied soley on N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama"5 to
support its decision that the broad subpoena power granted by the holding in
Oklahoma Press should not be applied to voluntary associations. A close reading of
the N.A.A.C.P. case does not appear to warrant its use in Mitchell v. Truck Drivers"
Local. In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama the State of Alabama subpoenaed the records of
the N.A.A.C.P. in order to determine whether that organization was involved in
intrastate business in violation of an Alabama statute requiring foreign corporations
to register with the Secretary of State. In examining the case, the Court recognized
that the government had the power to act even if it "discouraged the exercise of
constitutionally protected civil rights"26 as long as "the reasons for discouraging
them were constitutionally sufficient to justify its possible deterrent effect on such
freedoms. '27 Since the membership lists requested by the State were irrelevant to
the State's inquiry the Court refused to enforce the subpoena. The Court concluded
that "the production of the membership lists was so related to the right of the
members to pursue their private interests privately .. .as to come within the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment.128 The holding the Mitchell court attributed
to this case is quite different, i.e., that the rights and privileges of the voluntary
association are so bound up with that of the individual that the association is en-
titled to the personal protection of the fourth amendment. Moreover, there is an
essential factual distinction between the two cases. In Mitchell v. Truck Drivers
Local the membership lists were not specifically requested in the subpoena. Of
course, the lists would be necessary to check on the amount of dues which had been
paid. However, in N.A.A.C.P., the association showed that it could give an account-
ing of dues paid without revealing its membership list. Further, there was a definite
reason for protecting the membership lists in N.A.A.C.P. which is not present in
Mitchell - disclosure of the lists might easily have resulted in the members' being
subjected to extreme economic and social pressure, as the N.A.A.C.P. argued.
While this might have been the case with union members thirty years ago, it is
very doubtful that it is so today. Modem union members are not ostracized by their
neighbors and may not be discriminated against by their employer.2 9 Nor was there
argument made in Mitchell that disclosure of the membership lists might hurt
anyone. The reason for requiring the records, in fact, is so that the Government can
help the union members.
The Mitchell court also looked at the act itself, in determining that "necessity"
must be shown for the issuance of a subpoena. Section 601 (a) of the LMRDA
provides: "The Secretary shall have the power when he believes it necessary ...
to make an investigation.. ." The district court seized upon one word, i.e., necessary,
and from it decided that some "necessity" must be shown for issuing the subpoena.
An examination of the Congressional Record ° and the legislative history negates
this conclusion. When the bill was first reported in the Senate, it was opposed by a
minority group because it was insufficient. That group proposed several amendments
to the bill in order to strengthen it. One of the amendments concerned section
601 (a). As originally proposed this section required the Secretary to show probable
25 357 U.S. 449.
26 Id. at 466.
27 Id. at 461, quoting from American Communications Commission v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 402 (1949).
28 Id. at 466.
29 LAnoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 61
Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
30 105 CoNG. REc. 16490 (1959) (Remarks of Senator Goldwater). In discussing the
differences between the House and Senate versions of the LMRDA, the Senator said:
Section 601: Power and duty of Secretary to investigate violations of the
act .... Comment: The provisions in the Senate bill do not hamper the
investigatory power by requiring probable cause .... Differences: (1) The
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cause before he would be able to issue a subpoena.31 The minority felt this would
hamper the work of the Secretary and were successful in having the section
changed. 32 The Senate-passed bill enabled the Secretary to investigate when he
deemed it necessary. The bill retained the wording in its final enactment. It would
seem evident, then, that Congress contemplated requiring the Secretary to show
some reason for issuing a subpoena; but found it would pose too many difficulties
for him and did away with that requirement.
One of the major concerns of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act is to prevent misappropriation of union funds by its officers. It would be ex-
tremely difficult to detect such misappropriations without examining the union's
records. This being the situation, the Secretary of Labor would usually not be able
to show "necessity" for issuing a subpoena until he had seen the records concerned.
Thus, it would seem, the holding in the Mitchell case nullifies much of the
investigatory power given the Secretary by the LMRDA. The decision in this case
is a marked departure from the trend in the law to allow administrative agencies
to check freely into areas of public interest. John F. Costello
LABOR LAW- UNION SECURITY PROVISION - ONE-MAN EXCLUSIVE BAR-
GAINING REIPRESENTATIVE CANNOT ENTER INTO CONTRACT CONTAINING UNION
SECURITY CLAUSE.- The employees of the Grand Union Company selected Robert
Gray, an individual, as their exclusive bargaining agent in a representation elec-
tion. Gray and the company entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
contained a union security clause.' The employees formed a liason committee from
different departments to work with Gray and management representatives, and
they also elected trustees for fiscal supervision of Gray's representation operations.
The employees voted to ratify the contract, and they also voted to collect dues
of two dollars a month from each employee. Joseph Schultz, an employee, filed
charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the company, alleging
that the company, by entering into the agreement containing the union security
clause, had violated Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) ,2 since Gray was not a "labor organization"
within the meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8(a) (3) of the Act. The National Labor
Relations Board concluded3 Gray was a labor organization, and Schultz appealed.
Held: reversed. Gray was not a labor organization within the meaning of Section
8(a) (3), and therefore the company had illegally discouraged membership in any
House bill restricts the Secretary's power to investigate, to situations where
he has probable cause to believe a violation has occurred or is about to
occur; ...
31 Legislative History of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
45.
32 105 Cong. Rec. 5924 (1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
1 The clause read:
Each employee, as a condition of employment, will thirty (30) days after
his employment, or the effective date of this agreement, whichever is later,
designate Robert E. Gray as his representative for collective bargaining
purposes and shall continuously maintain said designation. On written notice
from the representative that an employee who has been employed for more
than thirty (30) days has failed to tender the periodic dues required as a
condition of maintaining said designation, the Employer will discharge said
employee within seven (7) days after receipt of such notice, unless within
such seven (7) days such employee's failure to make such designation or to
tender such dues is cured. Schultz v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 254, 255 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
2 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1952).
3 Grand Union Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1665 (1959).
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other union by forcing employees to pay dues to Gray. Schultz v. National Labor
Relations Board, 284 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) calls for employees
to have the utmost freedom in choosing their own representatives for purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Section 7 of the Act
states the rights of the employees:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a) (3) of this title.4
Section 1, in setting out the basic principles of the Act, calls the encourage-
ment of these rights "the policy of the United States." In light of these sections,
the courts have protected the right of employees to determine for themselves what
is in their own best interest in joining or forming labor organizations, without out-
side influence, either from their employers, outside labor unions, the NLRB, or
anyone else. Obviously, therefore, once a majority makes such a determination
and has had its choice certified by the Board, it is not to be taken lightly, lest
otherwise the rights of the employees may actually be infringed upon and the
purpose of the Act thwarted.
The basic principles of freedom of choice of organization, granted to employees
by virtue of section 7 of the Act, are strengthened by the provisions of section 8
which define unfair labor practices, both on the part of the employer and labor
organizations. Section 8(a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,
That nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of em-
ployment membership therein . . . (i) if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees . . . Provided further: that no employer
shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a
labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and
conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reason-
able grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership.5
An examination of the language of this section indicates that Congress in-
tended to distinguish between membership in a union and payment of the cost
of representation. 6 The committee report which brought the 1947 Taft Bill to the
floor of the Senate recognized the fact that union shop agreements promoted
stability in labor relations by eliminating "free riders."7 Senator Taft, in a Senate
debate, said: "Those not in a union get a free ride, that the union does the work,
gets the wages raised, then the man who does not pay dues rides along freely
without any expense to himself."8 In Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB,9 both
the Board and the court recognized the intent of Congress with regard to this
distinction, the court stating:
[T]he Union had the right, under the statue here involved, to prescribe non-
discriminatory terms and conditions for acquiring membership in the
4 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
5 Id. at § 158(a) (3). (Emphasis added.)
6 Compare, Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 547 (1960).
7 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947).
8 93 CONG. Rac. 4887 (1947).
9 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
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* Union, but we are unable to agree that it may adopt a rule that requires
the discharge of an employee for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees.' 0
And in Radio Officers Union v. NLRB" the Court recognized that Congress had
been concerned about free riders and had therefore given unions the power in
Section 8(a) (3) to meet that problem.
Section 8(a) (3) provides that it will be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "by discrimination in regard to ... any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." This provision
does not require any specific intent on the part of the employer to encourage or
discourage union membership, but under the common law rule that every per-
son is presumed to intend the forseeable consequences of his acts, if the employer's
conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership, with the single
exception allowed by the proviso to section 8(a) (3), that employer is guilty of
an unfair labor practice.' 2 From this it follows as a natural conclusion that the
unlawful encouragement of the payment of dues to one organization, as a con-
dition of employment, has as its natural and probable consequences the discouraging
of membership in another organization.
The committee report on the original National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) said:
The term "labor organization" is phrased very broadly in order that inde-
pendence of action guaranteed by section 7 of the bill and protected by
section 8 shall extend to all organizations of employees that deal with
employers.'
3
Section 2(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act defines a labor or-
ganization, in the same language as did the 1935 legislation, as
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation com-
mittee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condi-
tions of work.14
In keeping with the policy of the Act as set forth in sections 1 and 7, the
Courts have been very liberal in their inierpretation of what constitutes a labor
organization, so that "almost any group which negotiates with the management
concerning wages and working conditions of employees is a labor organization."'i5
A formal organization is not a prerequisite to a labor organization, 16 and a group
may be a labor organization without by-laws, officers or duesY.7
Instead of looking at the organization itself, the NLRB has looked at the
purpose for which the group exists as controlling, and, if that purpose is for deal-
ing with the employer for any of the reasons in sections 2(5) or 7 then the or-
ganization is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.'8 Accordingly,
employees informally grouping together and presenting a concerted demand to
their employer through three individuals as spokesmen have been declared a labor
organization by the Board.' 9
The Act requires employees to have a free choice in the selection of their
10 Id. at 1012.
11 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
12 Ibid.
13 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935). (Emphasis added.)
14 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1952).
15 Independent Circulation Union v. Item Co., 163 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D. La. 1958).
16 Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
17 See, e.g., Pacemaker Corp. v. NLR.B, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Sterling
Motors, Inc., 109 F.2d 194 (9th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 112 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1940).
18 See, e.g., Local 595, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 112 N.L.R.B. 812 (1955); National
Foundry of New York, Inc., 73 N.L.R.B. 16 (1947); Rane Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 352 (1945).
19 Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works, 55 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 145 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1944).
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bargaining representatives, and, literally following the words of the Act,20 the
employees are guaranteed independence in choosing the individual or labor or-
ganization they wish to act on their behalf as exclusive bargaining representative.
The fact that individuals may be, and have been certified as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative,21 does not mean that this has been often done. As a matter
of fact, one-man exclusive bargaining representatives are extremely rare.22
Although the Act permits an individual to be the certified representative of
a bargaining unit, the District of Columbia Circuit has reversed a ruling of the
Board which gave the individual representative the protection afforded by sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (c) .2 3 In Bonnaz Union v. NLRB,24 that Court said that an in-
dividual was obviously not, in any literal sense, such an organization, agency, com-
mittee or plan called for in the statutory definition of labor organization. On the
other hand, Judge Learned Hand has reasoned that an individual as an exclusive
bargaining representative was contemplated by the section 2(5) statutory defini-
tion of a labor organization:
The Act understands that "representatives" of employees may be other
than a "labor organization." Section 152(5) [2(5)] defines a "labor
organization" as "any organization of any kind" (Which I take to require
a group of individuals) "or any agency or employee representation commit-
tee or plan, in which employees participate ... ." I should suppose that,
read as it should be in contrast to "any organization of any kind," this
last language would include an individual to whom employees give au-
thority to deal with their employer. Therefore I cannot see any escape from
saying that a single person may be a "labor organization."25
In the case at hand the majority opinion follows a strict statutory reading,
comparing the frequency in the Act in which the terms individual and labor
organization are used disjunctively, demonstrating, it is argued, that Congress in-
tended to exclude individual from the term labor organization, and therefore that
Gray, as the exclusive bargaining representative, was not a "labor organization"
as that term was used in section 8(a) (3). To support this conclusion, the ma-
jority reasoned that Congress never intended that employees be compelled to pay
dues to individuals because of the difficulty in policing the actions of an individual
without the aid of the constitution and by-laws of a formal organization. Because
Gray, as an individual, was not a labor organization, the company could not enter
into a contract with him if that contract called for compulsory dues from the
employees as a condition of employment. Since Gray, as an individual, did not
meet the literal requisites of the union security protection which section 8(a) (3)
gives to a labor organization, the company was committing an unfair labor practice
by participating in such a contract. As the Court reasoned, giving effect to such
a provision discouraged membership in some other labor organization because the
employees had to pay dues to Gray, and "[c]ertainly no employee would pay dues
to a union if he was already paying them to Gray."26
The dissenting opinion agrees with the majority that to consider Gray, an
individual, as a labor organization would call for an "unnatural construction" of
section 2(5), but the dissent also reasons that the literal statutory language of
section 8(a) (3) must be met, and, therefore, it does not look at Gray alone to
see whether a labor organization was involved, but "at what the employees actually
did, or sought to do,' 27 to see whether or not their action fit within the scope of
20 Section 2(4) defines "representatives" to include "any individual or labor organization."
21 Campbell Offset Printing Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1421 (1951); Louisville Sanitary Wiper Co.,
65 N.L.R.B. 88 (1945); Robinson-Ransbottom Pottery Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1940).
22 See United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1955).
23 Bonnaz Union v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
24 Ibid.
25 United States v. Ryan, 225 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion), rev'd,
350 U.S. 299 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
26 Schultz v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 254, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
27 Id. at 260 (Dissenting opinion).
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the Act. The dissent reasons that the employees themselves created their own
labor organization and that Gray was part 'of it. After Gray was elected and
certified by the Board, he and the company entered into a contract containing
the union security provision. The employees voted to ratify this contract, and
then voted to impose dues
for organization and representation purposes ... as authorized and approved
by the membership or the joint board as the case may be. Such funds were
to be dispersed ... so far as the employees are concerned on prior authoriza-
tion by the joint board.28
The dissenting opinion concludes that the agreement in question was therefore
with the employees' own labor organization which "negotiated, spoke, and acted
through Gray. .... "29
The majority opinion in Schultz uses section 2(4), which defines representa-
tives, as an instance in which Congress clearly intended to distinguish between
individuals as representatives and labor organizations as representatives. Other sec-
tions resorted to in the majority opinion to illustrate the disjunctive use of the
terms individual and labor organization in the Act do not clearly illustrate situa-
tions concerning exclusive bargaining representatives, but rather employ language
indicating that labor organizations do not act for themselves, but must speak
through individuals. In other words, the court merely pointed out that the terms
were used disjunctively, but did not probe into the question of why these terms
were used in this manner. In sections 9(c) (1) (A) and 9(c) (1) (B) the word
individual, besides meaning the individual who has been certified as the bargain-
ing representative, can mean the individual through whom a labor organization
is acting, or an individual employee on behalf of his fellow employees.
In United States v. Ryan, 0 the court overruled the conviction of a labor union
officer for receiving money from an employer in violation of section 186 of the
LMRA, which makes unlawful certain payments to representatives of employees.
The court interpreted representatives to mean the "exclusive bargaining represen-
tative." The court reasoned that the possibility, however slight, of a one-man bar-
gaining representative is the only reason for the inclusion of the word individual
in section 2(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is obvious that any
labor organization when serving as exclusive bargaining representative, can ne-
gotiate, speak and act only through individuals. Many prohibitions or limitations
upon actions of labor organizations can be effective only if there are corresponding
limitations or prohibitions on the individuals, and therefore Congress "placed the
identical limitations on both individuals and organizations by terming both 'repre-
sentatives' of employees in section 2(4) ."3' Two decisions prior to the reversal by
the Supreme Court in Ryan reached similar conclusions as to the intent of Con-
gress in framing Section 2 (4) .82
Bonnaz Union v. NLRB illustrates quite clearly the results that can be ex-
pected where courts insist upon the strained literal approach and refuse to in-
clude an individual bargaining representative within the definition of the term
labor organization. In that case an employee was certified by the Board as the
exclusive bargaining agent for her fellow employees. The union made no effort
to organize the employees before the certification of this individual, but, after
hearing that the employees had organized behind an individual of their own choos-
ing, they picketed the entrance to the building in which the company was located
throughout the entire work day. Members of other unions would not cross the picket
lines, so the company could not receive materials or deliver its finished product.
28 Id. at 262 (Dissenting opinion).
29 Ibid.
30 350 U.S. 299 (1956).
31 Id. at 302.
32 United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42 (D. Minn. 1955); United States v. Con-
nelly, 129 F. Supp. 786 (D. Minn. 1955).
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An injunction was issued by the district court, on petition of the Board, to en-
join the union from picketing, the Court reasoning that section 8(b) (4) (C) was
clearly designed "to protect the certification of the Board and thereby to allow
collective bargaining to proceed in an orderly manner. . . ,,s3 The court said that
to distinguish between a labor organization and an individual who is acting as the
exclusive bargaining representative "would be to defeat the basic policies of the
Act." 34 The Court. of Appeals, reversing the ruling of the Board,35 disagreed with
the district court and said that the individual "obviously is not, in any literal sense,
such an organization, agency, committee, or plan"36 as encompassed in the section
2 (5) definition.
One of the purposes of the Act is to promote labor harmony, and section
8(b) (4) (C) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to force
an employer to bargain with it if "another labor organization" has been certified
by the Board to represent that particular unit. But the court in Bonnaz pre-
ferred to give a strict literal reading to the Act, thereby seeming to circumvent
one of the purposes of Congress in passing it: the elimination of those practices
by some labor organizations which have the necessary effect of burdening or
obstructing commerce.
The majority in Schultz goes to great lengths to indicate dangers to the em-
ployees as the result of the lack of a formal organization. These possible dangers
are used as a reason for excluding Gray and the employee organization behind
him from the definition of labor organization. This reasoning is clearly at odds
with the numerous decisions of the Board and the courts which have held that
even the most informal groups constitute a labor organization.3 7
It is not at all apparent that the court in Schultz should go to such a strained
literal reading of the Act to reach the result it desires. It is true, as the court
says, that section 8(a) (3) "is among the most carefully considered and completely
defined elements" of the Act.3 8 If this reasoning were followed to its logical con-
clusion, a literal interpretation would necessarily have to be given to this sec-
tion. Since Congress did not include individuals in the definition of labor or-
ganizations and since the union security provision of section 8(a) (3) was given
only to labor organizations, an individual bargaining representative could not be
afforded the same privileges. Another court has looked at the manner of inter-
preting section 8(a) (3) in a different manner:
Drawn to deal substantially with substantial things, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act has been from the beginning, and it must continue to be, consistently
with its avowed purpose and the language employed in the Act, broadly
construed and as broadly given effect to cope with and prevent the mischiefs
it was designed to meet and do away with. Shadow boxing with words ...
to reach a formal, a technical result, has therefore no proper place, and
may not be employed, in construing and applying it.39
This latter view is the position which is in general accord with the statutory
interpretation given by the courts. Although there is the natural presumption that
identical words used in different parts of an act have the same meaning, this
presumption is not rigid, and it is not unusual for the same word to be used with
different meanings in the same act. There is no rule of statutory construction
33 Douds v. Bonnaz Union, 124 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
34 Ibid.
35 Bonnaz Union, 111 N.L.R.B. 82 (1955).
36 Bonnaz Union v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
37 See, e.g., Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); Indiana Metal
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953); Sandy Hill Iron and Brass Works,
55 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 145 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1944).
38 Schultz v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 254, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
39 NLRB v. Metallic Bldg. Co., 204 F.2d 826, 828, (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 911 (1954).
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which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the
legislature intended it to have in each individual instance.40
Both the majority and the dissenting opinion in Schultz rely on a literal read-
ing of the Act, but there is still another approach. Instead of considering whether
Gray, or Gray and the employees, fit into the definition of a labor organization,
the policy underlying the statute should be considered. If the purpose of section
8(a) (3) is to eliminate "free riders", as appears to be the interpretation given
by the courts to the Congressional intent, then the employees and Gray are mere-
ly acting within their rights by imposing dues to cover representation expenses.
The situation here is not as unique as the court makes it out to be, because every
representative labor organization speaks through individuals, and the employees
of the Grand Union Company have chosen to speak through Gray. The employees
are guaranteed by section 7 to have complete independence in their choice of
representative for purposes of collective bargaining, and there is nothing in the
Act which indicates that a certified individual representative should not be on
an equal footing with a formal labor organization representative. Yet, by follow-
ing the reasoning of the court and not granting the employees and Gray the
protection afforded by section 8(a) (3), the court construes this section to favor
formal labor organizations, a result clearly not in keeping with the spirit of
Section 7. Freedom of choice must include an assumption by every certified repre-
sentative of the rights and obligations assumed by every other certified represen-
tative, or there would not be equality among the different'forms of representatives.
To give full effect to the spirit of section 7, section 8(a) (3) would have to in-
clude one-man bargaining representatives as well as formal labor organizations.
The Courts of Appeal are given power to review action by the Board in
sections 10(e) and 10(f) of the LMRA. It has been recognized, .however, that
in questions dealing with a specialized field of knowledge the Board is presumably
better equipped or informed by experience than the courts and its "findings with-
in that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and
therefore must respect." 41 When it comes to words having peculiar connotations
for those most knowledgeable with labor affairs, the Board's expertness comes into
play and the courts "should affirm its definition if that definition does not appear
too farfetched." 42
In Schultz as in Bonnaz, the court has overruled the conclusion of the Board
that the individual exclusive bargaining representative was a labor organization.
In the Bonnaz case, the Board said that the individual was "an employee repre-
sentation committee of one,"4 3 but the court disagreed, concluding that excluding
"individual" from the definition of a labor organization does not "produce an
absurd result or one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole." In Schultz, the Board said that the group of employees created a labor
organization by initiating an agency or plan for bargaining by authorizing an in-
dividual to represent them.45 'The court, in reversing the Board's opinion, said "we
must apply the definition which best serves to carry out the intentions and pur-
poses of the Act."" In both Bannaz and Schultz the courts pay lipservice to the
policy and purpose of the legislation, and yet reverse the Board's acceptance of
the policy of the Act and determination of what the Act should encompass. The
courts in these cases, in other words, disregard the expertise of the Board and
40 See Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc., v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
41 Union Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
42 NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956).
43 Bonnaz Union, 111 N.L.R.B. 82, 91 (1955).
44 Bonnaz Union v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
45 Grand Union Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1665 (1959).
46 Schultz v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 254, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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consider themselves better qualified to judge the purpose of the Act. Apparently
this is one of the "farfetched" statutory definitions mentioned by the Supreme
Court, in NLRB v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.4"
The Schultz court resorted to a strained literal interpretation of the LMRA
to reach the conclusion that an individual, although he could be certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit, could not enter into a
union security agreement with the company, although a formal labor organization
would not have been prohibited from making such an agreement. The Act guar-
antees freedom of the choice of bargaining representative to the employee, and the
recent LMRDA4s further protects and guarantees the freedom of the individual
employee. 49 The current trend is therefore towards the freedom of the individual
employee, freedom from all types of coercion, including that of the sort exercised
by labor organizations. This court, by adopting a literal interpretation of the Act,
seems to neglect the policy evidenced by the Taft-Hartley Act and the LMRDA -
namely, that employees should be assured of a full and free exercise of the rights
guaranteed by law. This decision significantly restricts the manner in which these
rights may be exercised.
Harold E. McKee
TORTS - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL SUFFERING - PERSISTENT
INDECENT PROPOSALS ACCOMPANIED BY INDECENT ExPosURE ACTIONABLE. -
Eccles telephoned Samms, a married woman, numerous times over a period of
eight months with proposals of illicit sexual intercourse. Eccles on one occasion
came to Samms' residence in connection with such a solicitation and made an in-
decent exposure of his person. Samms claimed she suffered severe emotional dis-
tress as a result of Eccles' conduct. She asked the trial court for $1500 actual dam-
ages and a like amount of punitive damages. A summary judgment was rendered
for the defendant on the grounds that the complaint stated no cause of action. On
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, held: reversed. An action exists for severe
emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact or injury, where the
defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where any reasonable person would have
known that such would result, and his actions are of such a nature as to be con-
sidered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344(1961).
The common law traditionally refused to grant recovery for mental suffering
independent of accompanying physical injury. Lord Wensleydale's famous dicta in
an 1861 English case represented this view:
Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone; though
where a material damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible ajury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the party
interested.'
Among the reasons put forth for the denial of recovery for mere mental suf-
fering were: that recovery would allow "a wide field open for imaginary claims,"1
2
that such injury is easily feigned without detection,3 that the injury is too remote4
or not the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's acts,5 and that the
47 350 U.S. 264 (1956).
48 LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73
Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959).
49 See generally, Comment, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 384 (1959).
1 Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861).
2 Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 58 L.T.R. (n.s.) 390, 392 (P.C. 1888).
3 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
4 Ibid.
5 Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
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answer to bad manners is not legal action but a toughening of the mental hide.6
One particularly outspoken judge called mental disturbance "intangible," "un-
trustworthy," "illusory," and "speculative," and predicted that allowing recovery
for such injury "would be great danger, if not disaster, to the cause of practical
justice."'
An 1888 English case, Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas8 stated
the proposition that injury resulting from mere terror unaccompanied by any actual
physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot be considered an
ordinary consequence of negligence. Nine years later, the Court of Queen's Bench,
while recognizing the rule laid down in Coultas, nevertheless permitted recovery
for mental injury "wilfully" inflicted. 9 In Wilkinson v. Downton10 the plaintiff
recovered for mental distress suffered when the defendant as a practical joke told
her that her husband had been accidentally injured and needed her assistance.
The court distinguished this case from Coultas on the basis that this case contained
an element of wilful wrong.:1 Intent to cause the harm done was apparently imputed
to the defendant since his intent clearly was not to do harm but to play a practical
joke. 2 This, it would seem, was the court's device for providing an obviously ag-
grieved plaintiff with recovery, since Coultas prevented recovery to the plaintiff
whose injury resulted from another's negligence. The case may well represent the
birth of intentional infliction of mental suffering as a separate and distinct action-
able tort.13
Soon after, the King's Bench refused to follow the Coultas decision, as had the
Exchequer Division in Ireland, and permitted recovery to a female plaintiff who
suffered mental distress and resultant injuries when the defendant negligently drove
his team of horses into a public house where plaintiff was employed.1 4 Succeeding
English cases have recognized this decision as the law of England.1 5
The third English milepost in the area of mental suffering was Janvier v.
Sweeney."6 There mental injury was sustained by the plaintiff when the defendant,
6 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1936).
7 Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 At. 1022, 1023 (1905).
8 58 L.T.R. (n.s.) 390 (P.C. 1888).
9 Wilkinson v. Downton, 66 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 493 (1897).
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 495:
(T)here was not in that case (Coultas) any element of wilful wrong, nor
perhaps was the illness so direct and natural a consequence of the defend-
ant's conduct as in this case. On these grounds it seems to me that the
case of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas... is not an authority
on which this case ought to be decided.
12 This point was made by Duke, L. J., in Janvier v. Sweeney, 88 L.J.K.B. 1231 (1919),
at 1235: "In that case there was no intention to commit a wrongful act; the defendant merely
intended to play a practical joke upon the plaintiff."
13 Supra note 9, at 496: "I think, however, that it must be admitted that the present case
is without precedent."
14 Dulieu v. White, 70 L.J.K.B. 837 (1901) at 841:
A judgment of the Privy Council (Coultas) ought, of course, to be treated
by this court as entitled to very great weight indeed; but it is not binding
upon us, and in venturing most respectfully not to follow it in the present
case, I am fortified by the fact that its correctness was treated by Lord
Esher, M.R., in his judgment itn Pugh v. London, Brighton, and South Coast
Railway (1896) as open to question; that it was disapproved by the
Exchequer Division in Ireland in Bell v. Great Northern Railway Co. of
Ireland, where, in the course of his judgment, Chief Baron Palles gives a
reasoned criticism of the Privy Council judgment, which with all respect, I
entirely adopt; and, lastly, by the fact that I find that the judgment has
been unfavorably reviewed by legal authors of recognized weight, such as
Mr. Sedgwick, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Mr. Beven.
15 LAw REvISioN Commission, 388 (N.Y. 1936).
16 88 LJ.K.B. 1231 (1919).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
in order to compel her to divulge information regarding her employer, charged her
with corresponding with a German spy and otherwise attempted to "browbeat" her.
Recovery was granted for this intentional infliction of mental suffering. The court
based its decision on Wilkinson v. Downton, although the defendant's intent in
this case was clearly to cause mental duress and Downton's intent was to play a
practical joke.
It may be said, therefore, that English courts have permitted redress of mental
suffering whether it be negligently inflicted,17 intentionally inflicted,18 or the re-
sult of intentional conduct not intended to result in mental suffering but very likely
to do so.19
Meanwhile, American courts followed the maxim laid down in Coultas that no
recovery could be had for mental suffering negligently inflicted in the absence of
accompanying physical impact or physical injury.20 Buoyed by Wilkinson, the courts
found increasingly more liability for mental suffering intentionally inflicted, on
the basis of traditional forms of action. Among these were assault,21 battery,22 false
imprisonment, 2  trespass to a house at night,2" nuisance,2 5 "wilful and unlawful
trespass," 26 invasion of privacy 2 and seduction.28 An early device was founding
recovery on the contractual duty of common carriers to keep their passengers from
physical and mental harm.29 The common carrier principle has been extended to
hotels 0 and circuses," among others.
Reliance on traditional forms of action gradually slackened, however. A legal
theory of Thomas Atkins Street, expounded in 1906, seems to have predicted this
change: "The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor belongs
essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized
as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of
liability.'. 2
Despite the Restatement's denial in 1934 that intentional infliction of mental
suffering was an independent tort, 3 Dean Prosser could say five years later:
It is time to recognize that the courts have created a new tort. . . . Of
course, there is no necessity whatever that there should be separate torts, or
17 Supra note 14.
18 Janvier v. Sweeney, supra note 16.
19 Wilkinson v. Downton, 66 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 493 (1897).
20 Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.L. Ry. Go., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Ad. 340 (1892) and the
following, all citing Victorian Ry Gomm'rs v. Coultas, 58 L.T.R. (n.s.) 390 (P.C.) (1888):
Haile's Curator v. Texas, 60 Fed. 557 (5th Cir. 1894) (insanity not the probable result of a
railway accident); Braun v. Graven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Spade v. Lynn &
B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), and Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y.
107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
21 Leach v. Leach, 33 S.W. 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). Plaintiff was "not touched,
except by his foul breath and speech."
22 DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
23 Talcott v. National Exhibition Co., 128 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (App. Div. 1911).
24 Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902).
25 Shellabarger v. Morris, 91 S.W. 1005 (Mo. App. 1905).
26 Id. at 1007.
27 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
28 Haeissig v. Decker, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W. 1085 (1918).
29 Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 Fed. Gas. 413 (No. 2575) (C.G.D. Mass. 1823) (Pas-
senger ship); Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899) (Streetcar).
30 Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1923).
31 Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S.W. 692 (1916).
32 1 STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
33 RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 46, p. 86 (1934):
Except as stated in §§ 21 to 34 [assault] and § 48 [special liability of
carriers for insult], conduct which is intended or which though not so in-
tended is likely to cause only a mental or emotional disturbance to another
does not subject the actor to liability (a) for emotional distress resulting
therefrom, or (b) for bodily harm unexpectedly resulting from such dis-
turbance.
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that a tort must have a name; but if a name must be found for this one,
we might do worse than to borrow a word from the vernacular of Kentucky
and points south, and call it "orneriness." It is something very like assault.
It consists of the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an
extreme form.34
At first, recovery for the intentional infliction of mental suffering was confined
to specific factual situations.3 5 Among these were evictions,3 8 and bill collections.
In a North Carolina case the conduct of a collecting agent was actionable where
he reviled a female debtor as a "deadbeat" and threatened her with arrest.8 7 A
third situation was characterized by the misuse of authority, as where school
officials accused a high school girl of unchastity and threatened her with reform
school .3 The mishandling of dead bodies provided another area of recovery. The
disinterment of a loved one's body and its removal to another cemetery without
the family's assent was held actionable.3 9 Finally, unusually cruel practical jokes
served to impose liability, such as where a supermarket manager had a dead rat
wrapped up and delivered to a customer.
40
In 1948 the Restatement of Torts Supplement in reversing its 1934 position
recognized in very broad terms recovery for intentional infliction of mental suf-
fering.41 By the 1950's Ohio was apparently the only state that refused to recognize
the tort.42 Recovery was being extended to new factual situations in other juris-
dictions. Dean Prosser, who in 1939 heralded the emergence of the new tort, had
this to say in 1956:
By the middle of this century, it appears to be quite generally recognized
that the nameless wrong which, for lack of anything better, usually is called
the intentional infliction of mental suffering, or mental anguish, or mental
disturbance, or emotional distress, has such distinct and definite features
of its own that it is entitled to be regarded as a separate tort.43
What appears to be the most helpful definition yet of intentional infliction of
mental suffering is contained in the Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement of
Torts:
One who, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from it.44
A major change from the 1948 version of this section is the allowal of re-
covery for conduct that is "reckless." It is into this area that the present case
would appear to fall. In her complaint the plaintiff characterized the defendant's
34 'Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. Rv. 874(1939).
35 See PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955), at 42; 25 So CAL. L. Rnv. 440 (1952).
36 Duncan v. Donnell, 12 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
37 Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores, 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936), (premature birth of
dead child held actionable if the natural result of the attack).
38 Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926). Accord, Janvier v. Sweeney,
88 L.J.K.B. 1231 (1919).
39 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 262
N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933).
40 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22 (1931).
41 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948): "One who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional
distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it."
42 Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948). Recovery was refused a
plaintiff, who was pregnant, because, as Judge Stewart explained, the defendant did not
threaten the plaintiff; thus no assault was made out. The decision was four to three, At 738,
however, the court said:
The weight of authority seems to be, and certainly it is the rule in Ohio,
that there is no liability for merely negligent acts which cause fright or shock
unaccompanied by contemporaneous physical injury, even though subse-
quent illness results, where the negligent acts complained of are neither
wilful nor malicious. (Emphasis added.)
43 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALUF. L. Rxv. 40 (1956).
44 Id. at 43.
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conduct as "wilful and wanton," a phrase which Dean Prosser believes describes
an aggravated form of negligence. 45 But the court relied heavily on the 1948
Restatement46 to grant the plaintiff a cause of action for intentional infliction of
mental suffering. It is fair to suggest that the defendant's intent was not to inflict
mental harm upon the plaintiff. Eccles' failure to foresee that his persistent
solicitations and his indecent exposure would result in mental harm to the plaintiff
could more aptly be considered reckless conduct. The conduct partakes of an in-
tentional tort insofar as the acts themselves- surely are intended, but insofar as
the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would be harmful his con-
duct is negligent. Recklessness seems to lie between that which is intentional
and that which is negligent. The fact that the defendant alleged wilful and
wanton conduct and was granted a cause of action on an intentional tort illumines
the confusion in this area of the law.
The dissenting opinion urges that the plaintiff, in failing to allege an intention
on the part of the defendant to inflict mental harm, or that the defendant should
have known that such would result, failed to state a cause of action. While the
disssenting judge is aware that the plaintiff did not allege an intentional tort
wherein the defendant actually intended the harm, he joins with the majority in
failing to recognize the defendant's conduct as reckless, for which the Tentative
Draft of the Restatement and several cases47 hold there may be recovery.
The confusion seems to center about the persistence of the courts in consider-
ing under the heading "intentional infliction of mental suffering" both conduct
in which the defendant clearly intends mental injury and that in which he in-
tends some independent act which results in mental injury. The latter may be
termed "reckless infliction of mental suffering."
The great weight of cases prohibits recovery, independent of any other tort,
for solicitations of illicit sexual intercourse resulting in mental pain.48 The standard
approach is that "there is no harm in asking."'4 9 However, there have been some
45 Prosser, supra note 35 at 150:
They (the terms wilful, wanton and reckless) apply to the type of negli-
gence which borders on intent, and has been called quasi-intent ...(Wilfulness) means that the actor desired to bring about the harm which
has occurred, or at least that he was aware that it was substantially cer-
tain to follow. . . . "Wantoness" or "recklessness," on the other hand,
means that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable
character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must
be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable
that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indiffer-
ence to the consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that they shall
follow....
In practice, such subtle distinctions have been ignored, and "wilful," "wan-
ton," and "reckless" conduct have been grouped together as an aggravated
form of negligence.
46 In his comment on section 46 of the 1948 Restatement, the reporter makes two
caveats, that he will venture no comment on mental distress inflicted either by negligence
or reckless conduct. It is to be inferred, therefore, that the Restatement was referring only
to harm intentionally inflicted. Otherwise, the rule is very broad, lacking the clearer definition
of the tentative draft.
47 Among them are: Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153
At. 22 (1930); Wilkinson v. Downton, 66 L.J.Q.B. (N.S.) 493 (1897); Bielitski v. Obadisk,
61 D.L.R. 494 (Sask. K.B. 1921); and Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Ati. 273 (1927).
While these cases do not explicitly recognize recovery on the basis of reckless infliction of
mental suffering, the defendant's conduct in each fits that classification.
48 Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S.W. 318 (1905); Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky.
816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666 66 N.Y. Supp. 454 (Sup Ct.
1900).
49 Magruder, supra note 7, at 1055.
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exceptions to this rule.50 Notable among them is Mitran v. Williamson,51 a 1960
New York decision closely. analogous to the Samms case. In Mitran the defendant
wrote the plantiff a letter suggesting they meet, later telephoned her with immoral
proposals and, when she refused, mailed her obscene pictures of himself. The
plaintiff was held to have a cause of action. Although the complaint accused the
defendant of unlawful, wilful or malicious trespass on the plaintiff's person, the
conduct would more aptly be called reckless, rather than intentional, infliction of
mental suffering. The defendant's intention presumably was not to cause pain
but to derive pleasure.
Thus far, courts have been reluctant to term a defendant's conduct in mental
suffering cases as reckless. Nevertheless, there has been some measure of re-
covery where the defendant's conduct properly could have been termed reckless.
It is suggested, therefore, that the distinction between intentional infliction of
mental suffering and reckless infliction of mental suffering, as heretofore indi-
cated, be taken into account. Greater clarity in the law of mental suffering would
result.52 From a practical standpoint, recognition of the distinction could pre-
vent inconsistencies of the kind inherent in the complaint in Samms. It would
provide plaintiffs with a more certain cause of action in those instances where
the defendant's conduct was intended but where the injury was not. Finally, ac-
ceptance of this distilction would make unnecessary any fictional imputation of
an intent that the defendant never harbored, for the sake of calling the action
intentional infliction of mental suffering. An area of the law that has been casting
off fictions should not be burdened with one as unnecessary as this. There seems
to be no good reason for restricting tort liability in this area to intention and
negligence. The name must serve, not master.
Edmund John Adams
50 Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934) (where the defendant took
plaintiff's hand and offered her money); Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177
(1910), (where the defendant's solicitations were inferred from his deceitful luring of the
plaintiff from her home and his driving of his carriage past the alleged destination and
the mental distress from fear of gossip); Roland v. Batchelder, 84 Va. 664, 5 S.E. 695
(188) (based on Virginia's actionable word statute); and Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76
Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) (where an agent of the defendant, a creditor, threatened
to take the debt out "in trade," meaning illicit sexual intercourse).
51 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
52 A further, but probably impractical, suggestion on the matter of clarity might be to
discard the "wilful" in the phrase "wilful and wanton" conduct. As Dean Prosser points out
in note 45 "wilful" and "wanton" do mean different things. In practice they have been
absorbed into one phrase; nonetheless, wilful does connote an "intention" that "wanton,"
properly understood, does not.
